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On 4 October 1944, radio sets in London received the following message from
embattled Warsaw:
This is the stark truth. We were treated worse than Hitler’s satellites, worse than
Italy, Roumania [sic], Finland. May God, who is just, pass judgement on the terrible
injustice suffered by the Polish nation, and may He punish accordingly all those who are
guilty.
Your heroes are the soldiers whose only weapons against tanks, planes and
guns were their revolvers and bottles filled with petrol. Your heroes are the women who
tended the wounded, and carried messages under fire, who cooked in bombed and
ruined cellars to feed children and adults, and who soothed and comforted the dying.
Your heroes are the children who went on quietly playing among the smoldering ruins.
These are the people of Warsaw.
Immortal is the nation that can muster such universal heroism. For those who
have died have conquered, and those who live on will fight on, will conquer and again
bear witness that Poland lives when Poles live.1

This marked the final transmission of the Lightning (Błyskawicaradio) radio
station of the Polish Home Army fighting for Warsaw in the fall of 1944. Lightning gave
battle reports in English for British listeners. According to Jan Nowak, who composed
the reports, the goal of Radio Lightning was to “do everything to see that it [the Warsaw
Uprising] did not remain a tempest in a teacup, unnoticed by the rest of the world.” 2
However, Nowak’s work did little to sway the West to assist the Poles in their titanic
struggle for freedom. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, men far
removed from Poland’s struggle and its sufferings, had already decided on the Polish
issue.3 The anger, resentment, and pride in the last broadcast of the Polish resistance
in Warsaw shows what many Poles thought of their allies and how they reconciled
themselves to their failure to assert independence.
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Two months earlier, faced with political pressures, incitements by Soviet radio,
and the close proximity of the Red Army, the Polish resistance movement launched an
assault on Nazi control of Warsaw.4 The Warsaw Uprising (1 August-2 October 1944)
was the largest act of any armed resistance movement during the war.5 It was a
catastrophic failure and the last gasp of the Polish resistance’s effort to preserve
Poland’s sovereignty after the war.6 250,000 Poles, most of them civilians, died
supporting the cause of resistance against oppression.7 When Red Army troops entered
the city in January 1945, it was a complete ruin.8 One of the most splendid and historic
capitals of the world was no more.
For those who fought in the uprising and those who lost loved ones in it, the
question of blame for such a catastrophe looms large. After the war, the Poles needed a
way to explain the suffering that beset their nation. Their reaction to the disaster of
World War II was to draw on a long-standing historical narrative of Poland as a martyred
nation. Poles view their nation as one frequently betrayed and victimized. This
victimization often takes a religious undertone, as Poles see Poland suffering for the
sins of Europe. Their narrative of the Warsaw Uprising contains both of the component
parts of Poland’s identity of betrayal and martyrdom: suffering in the many Polish dead
and betrayal in the actions of Poland’s allies.
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The Warsaw Uprising
Before its destruction in 1944, Warsaw was an important cultural center for
hundreds of years. It was the center of the Polish royal court from 1596 to 1796 and
was the capital of both the Warsaw Confederation and Congress Poland in the 19th
century.9 The city became the capital of newly independent Poland in 1918 because of
its rich heritage. It was a symbol for the lifeblood of the Polish state and people. It is
fitting that in this symbolic city, Poland experienced its greatest martyrdom.
Warsaw was a major center of the Polish resistance during World War II. The
largest group of the Polish resistance was the Home Army. It was an umbrella
organization of smaller resistance groups that appeared almost as soon as the ink had
dried on the terms of Polish capitulation in 1939.10 The Home Army was loyal to the
Underground State, which acted as a secret government in Poland for the resistance.
Resistance in Poland during the war was widespread; and the Home Army and
Underground State were remarkable in their size and organization. The Underground
State reported to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.11 Also referred to as the
London Poles, the Polish Government-in-Exile was a unity government consisting of the
major prewar political parties, save the disgraced Sanation regime.12 The Underground
State organized civilian support for the Home Army, facilitated help as best it could to
those suffering under Nazi occupation, and gave Poles a sense of self-control through
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its legal system and publications.13 The support of the Polish people and the tenacity of
the leadership of both the Home Army and the Underground State made for a potent
combination. In a way, the success of the Polish resistance movement was its undoing.
By producing a resistance movement large enough to take the Nazis head on, the
Polish resistance threw itself into a conflict that it was woefully underprepared to
undertake.
The Home Army committed around 50,000 men to the Warsaw Uprising.14 These
men were the bulk of the Home Army’s strength. Once the Nazis fully recognized the
scale of the uprising, they began reprisals and massacres against the local population.
Targeting the Wola district, they killed at least 40,000 noncombatants over seven days
in early August.15 The Wola Massacre was indicative of the Nazi strategy of outright
targeting of Polish civilians. In August and September, the Nazis killed an estimated
150,000 Polish civilians throughout Warsaw. They hoped to break the back of the Polish
resistance by means of extreme brutality. If there were no Poles alive to resist, then
there was no Polish resistance. By the time Soviet forces liberated the city in January of
the following year, it was virtually unpopulated – the Nazis expelled more than half a
million Varsovians and killed those whom they did not expel.16 After the Home Army’s
surrender on 2 October, the Nazis set about destroying the city. They destroyed almost
all major historical buildings and around 42 percent of all structures in the city.17 Hitler
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ordered this done as a mark of righteous German fury over what he saw as the
perfidious actions of an inferior people.
The Warsaw Uprising was not just a Polish and German affair. The Big Three
Powers, in varying degrees, set the conditions of Warsaw’s destruction in motion.18 The
Soviet Union indirectly played a large role in starting the uprising. On 29 July, a Soviet
controlled Polish-language radio station, called the Union of Polish Patriots, issued an
appeal to Varsovians to rise up against Nazi occupation.19 Similar calls appeared the
next day from Moscow-based radio Kościuszko.20 To cap their efforts off, the Soviets
dropped flyers over Warsaw appealing for a national revolt on the same day.21These
appeals implied that Soviet aid would shortly arrive to help any Polish attempts to wrest
control of Warsaw from the Nazis. The Home Army feared that the Nazis, upon
intercepting these radio broadcasts, would begin large-scale round ups of the civilian
population for forced labor and executions.22 The Nazis planned to anchor their lines on
the Eastern Front around Warsaw and consequently needed large numbers of laborers
to construct defenses.23 Nazi leadership was concerned that a general uprising would
break out in the city. In order to preempt this, they planned to kill large numbers of
Varsovians and sow fear among the survivors. The Home Army figured it was best to
preempt the Nazis. If the Home Army did not act before the Nazis got a chance to
implement their plans, the majority of Home Army fighters in and around Warsaw would
have been impressed into defensive preparations for the cause of prolonging Nazi
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occupation, if not executed. Inactivity meant death for the Home Army. Home Army
leadership had a decision: face the Nazis in battle or let them destroy Polish resistance
without a fight. The Home Army chose to fight.
Soviet radio broadcasts leading to the uprising were more than simple
propaganda transmissions. The Soviets had reason to predict Warsaw’s liberation. In
late July 1944, the defeat of the Nazis seemed apparent – they had lost their Army
Group Center and close to half a million men in Operation Bagration in Belarus on the
Eastern Front.24 Soviet forces liberated all prewar Soviet territories by late July, and
Western Allies had Paris in sight on the Western Front. To the Home Army, the advance
of the Red Army seemed unstoppable.25 Reports of Soviet forward patrols reaching
Warsaw filtered through Home Army leadership on 29 July.26 It appeared clear that the
time for Poland’s rising was now or never.
The uprising was the culmination of a year of preparation and build up. In fall of
1943, at the behest of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, the Home Army began
to plan and prepare for a national uprising titled Operation Tempest.27 The operation
called for active resistance against Nazi occupation in major urban areas once the Red
Army was in a positon to liberate Poland. The goal of Operation Tempest was to seize
control of major Polish cities from the Nazis before the Red Army arrived. In preparation
for the launch of Operation Tempest, the Home Army drew down its attacks on the
Nazis and squirreled away men and weapons. The Home Army’s strategy of
conservation in anticipation of a national uprising led to accusations by British and
24
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Soviet intelligence of stagnation and incompetency. Reports describing the Home Army
as ineffectual made the whole Polish resistance movement look insignificant. As
Operation Bagration reached its latter stages in the summer of 1944, forces of the
Home Army successfully liberated Lviv and launched attacks against Nazi forces in
Vilnius, Polesia, Białystok, Lublin, Radom, Kielce, and Łódź. Not all of these attacks
were successful, but they showed that the Home Army was capable of doing something
to resist the Nazis. When Home Army units would link up with their Soviet “liberators,”
they were disbanded, their weapons seized, and their leaders arrested by the
N.K.V.D.28 By late July, the Red Army reached the eastern bank of the Vistula River.
The radio calls by the Soviets for a Polish rising in Warsaw were, in the minds of the
Home Army, a premonition of Soviet advance. Since the Red Army was by then so
close to Warsaw and had been disbanding smaller units of the Home Army, Home Army
leadership felt in a dire situation. It had a choice: establish own control of Warsaw or
face arrest and execution by the N.K.V.D.
The Soviets also forced the hand of the Home Army by founding the Polish
Committee of National Liberation in Lublin ten days before the start of the uprising. The
Polish Committee of National Liberation, commonly known as the Lublin Committee
from its base of operations, was a Soviet puppet provisional government.29 The Lublin
Committee signed agreements with Stalin early in the summer of 1944 that stated that
the Red Army was to imprison the Home Army after the war and that the Lublin
Committee was to form the basis of the new Polish government.30 The Underground
State and the Polish Government-in-Exile now faced a challenger to their position as the
28
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proper government of Poland. The existence of a Soviet puppet government on Polish
soil put added pressure on the Home Army to secure a major Polish city with its own
forces. The Underground State was fearful that if the Home Army did not control a
major, symbolic city and gain a notable military success, the Soviets would completely
brush aside any chance of Polish independence.31 With no territory under their control
and no major successes to point to, the Underground State had little chance of gaining
the support they needed for their survival from the West and from the Polish people.
Stalin stood in the way of legitimacy for the Underground State. He thought of the
Underground State as a nuisance to his postwar goals for Poland and did not recognize
its parent, the Polish Government-in-Exile. During the Warsaw Uprising, he claimed that
Home Army fighters were nothing more than lawless criminals.32 If these lawless
criminals controlled the prewar capital of Poland with a force numbering in the tens of
thousands, he would have to take a different tone. A victory in Warsaw was the
Underground State’s last chance to preempt Soviet domination after the war.
The Underground State had its hopes for victory dashed largely because of
inactivity on the part of Poland’s allies. The Soviets doomed Polish forces in Warsaw by
not allowing Western warplanes to use nearby Soviet-controlled airfields to perform
shuttle-bombing runs or to resupply Home Army units at the start of the uprising.33
Soviet refusal to allow for Western aid or to support the uprising themselves caused
tension with Britain. In mid-August, Churchill asked Stalin to support the uprising but
Stalin rebuffed him.34 Only in mid-September, after the uprising was clearly doomed, did
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the Soviets allow the West to make use of their airfields. The British were able to deliver
58 or so low-level airdrops; the Americans only preformed one airdrop, though it was of
significant size.35 A lack of communication with the Home Army hampered Western
supply runs. Nazi forces captured half of all the supply packages.36 The British, in
addition to supply drops, could have deployed paratroopers to help the Poles at the start
of the uprising. They had a unit of Polish expatriate paratroopers under their command
titled the First Independent Parachute Brigade. The British decided not to use these
paratroopers to help Warsaw because they believed that the uprising was a
misadventure.37 Instead, the paratroopers deployed to the Netherlands during Operation
Market Garden.38 In consequence, Western support failed to make a difference in the
uprising. If the Western Allies would have provided full air support from the beginning of
the uprising, however, and allowed the First Independent Parachute Brigade to drop on
Warsaw, the course of the uprising would have been different.
Stalin’s refusal to allow Western warplanes to use Soviet airfields disappointed
Churchill and Roosevelt, but they decided not to override Stalin’s orders. Both leaders
responded differently to the uprising. Churchill, hearing the broadcasts of Radio
Lightning, was far more sympathetic to the Polish cause.39 Roosevelt, on the other
hand, was aloof about the uprising and more concerned with the relationship between
the West and the Soviet Union in the long term. Churchill sent a message to Roosevelt
on 25 August asking Roosevelt to ignore Soviet restriction of airfield use, and
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consequently see what would happen.40 Roosevelt replied, “I do not consider it would
prove advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join with you… I
have taken into consideration Uncle J.’s present attitude towards the relief of the
Underground forces in Warsaw.”41 Roosevelt, representing the larger of the two powers,
checked Churchill’s impetuousness. He did not want to offend Stalin going into the
important Yalta Conference early next year. Roosevelt also needed Stalin’s support for
concluding the war with Japan. In late 1944, it appeared that an invasion of the
Japanese home islands was the only way to force Japan out of the war, and Roosevelt
wanted Soviet military assistance for the prospective invasion. He decided that good
terms with Stalin were worth more than thousands of Polish lives.42
The Home Army needed significant help in order to win. Nazi forces completely
outmatched the Poles in firepower and air support. Yet, the Soviets were not willing to
push their forces to assist with the uprising or to provide artillery and air support.43
Whether or not the Soviets were calculating in their lack of support is debatable. The
Red Army had just launched a major and successful offensive earlier that summer and
needed respite. Strained from their advances, Soviet supply lines were not in an ideal
situation.44 In late August, Soviet General Konstantin Rokossovsky, commander of the
1st Belorussian Front, which was near Warsaw, told B.B.C. correspondent Alexander
Werth that the Nazis had advanced four armored divisions against Soviet forces when
they arrived at the Vistula. The Nazi counterattack, according to Rokossovsky, made
the Red Army unable to render adequate assistance to the Poles fighting in Warsaw. In
40
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Rokossovsky’s view, the Home Army foolishly launched the uprising without any serious
promise of Soviet support. He described the uprising as, “‘a bad mistake,’” and
dismissed Soviet calls for an uprising as “‘routine stuff.’”45 He claimed that the Home
Army did not attempt to communicate with the Red Army and placed all blame for the
failure of the Warsaw Uprising on the leadership of the Home Army.46 Despite the Nazi
forces arrayed against them, a unit of the Red Amy was able to reach Warsaw. The
First Polish Army, a unit of Polish expatriates largely drawn from Poles deported to the
Soviet Union after its annexation of eastern Poland in 1939, was able to make some
headway across the Vistula and into Warsaw during the uprising.47 This is to say that
the only unit of the Red Army that attempted to help was entirely Polish. For his efforts
in support of his countrymen, the commander of the First Polish Army, Zygmunt Berling,
was relieved of command.48 Soviet troops simply would not fight in what Soviet
leadership thought was a Polish struggle. On the other hand, that a large unit of the Red
Army was able to cross the Vistula shows that Soviet forces would have been able to
liberate Warsaw in conjunction with the Home Army. By not ordering the Red Army to
join in the uprising, the Soviets left the Poles to their own devices in a fight against
vastly superior Nazi forces. The Soviets, in effect, damned the Polish effort to liberate
Warsaw.
The Poles, alone, did not stand a chance against the Nazis, yet they fought on
heroically. They had little choice, as Nazi forces surrounded them and gave no quarter.
The bloody and ultimately futile struggle for Warsaw is symbolic of Poland’s overall
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experience in World War II. The Poles continued to fight, despite their allies abandoning
them. The actions of Poland’s allies during the uprising buttressed the Polish view of
their country as being a betrayed victim. The bravery of Poles in laying down their lives
at the altar of freedom despite being in a hopeless situation forged a national sense of
pride. The Poles may have been the victims of disingenuous allies and monstrous
enemies, but, in their eyes, they had earned eternal glory as a people willing to suffer
for the cause of freedom.

Diplomacy
The major question that Poles grappled with in the wake of their tragic
experience in World War II is why their Western allies seemingly betrayed them.
The Polish resistance movement, early in the war, thought of itself as being able
to rely on its Western allies. World War II in Europe started, officially, because of the
West’s commitment to Polish sovereignty. After the Soviets and Nazis carved up
Poland, the French hosted the Polish Government-in-Exile in Paris. After the fall of
France, the Polish Government-in-Exile moved to London. The London Poles thought of
themselves as being a member of the Allies in good standing. They hoped to have the
same status and receive the same treatment as the French Government-in-Exile, as
both were part of the original alliance against Nazi Germany. To this end, the London
Poles helped raise military forces from Polish expatriates. The British supplied, trained,
and commanded Polish expatriate units that fought in the Mediterranean Theater and
on the Western Front.49 Polish soldiers fought side-by-side with British and Americans.
They were eager to contribute to the Allied cause and get much-desired revenge
49
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against the Nazis. The London Poles assumed that their host and benefactor, the
United Kingdom, would do its utmost to preserve Polish independence and territorial
sovereignty. After all, Polish sovereignty is what technically drew Britain into the war. If
Poland did not have independence and sovereignty at the end of the war, then the
starting goal of the war was lost. When Poland fell under Soviet control after the war,
Poles felt that their Western Allies had totally betrayed them.
At the end of the war, it seemed that Poland was alone – Poland could count on
no dependable allies or friendly neighbors. Yet Poland’s isolation started during the
beginning of the war with the failure of Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski’s diplomacy.
The centerpiece of his strategy was an attempt to foster good relations with the Soviet
Union and the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile. The strategy failed, as both
repudiated Polish diplomatic goals.
Sikorski thought that a union with Czechoslovakia would create a state powerful
enough to resist both Russia and Germany in the long term. Sikorski’s idea was a
rehashing of Józef Piłsudski’s idea of Intermarium.50 Piłsudski, Poland’s head of state
after World War One, believed that the small nations of Eastern Europe between
Germany and Russia should unite under Polish leadership to preserve their
independence in the face of Russian and German imperialism.51 Piłsudski failed to
realize his ambition, but the idea of Poland unifying with a neighboring small power
intrigued Sikorski as the answer to mutual Russian and German aggression.
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Sikorski was never able to win the Czechoslovaks over and the relationship
between the two exiled governments deteriorated over time.52 The Czechoslovaks
rejected Sikorski’s union, which was officially proposed in 1940.53 Czechoslovakian
President Edvard Beneš figured correctly that the Soviet Union would come to dominate
Eastern Europe after the war and sought to maintain a good relationship with the
Soviets, even if that meant souring relations with the Poles.54 Soviet diplomatic
pressure, in conjunction with Czechoslovak reservations, sealed the fate of Sikorski’s
hopes.55 Having never experienced Russian or Soviet occupation, the Czechoslovaks
figured that being a Soviet protectorate would be more benign than unification with
Poland. In contrast to the Russians, the Poles had a history of recent conflict with
Czechoslovakia.56 The Czechoslovaks were afraid that a union with the much larger
Poland would be a license for Polish domination. The proposed union would leave
Poland the dominant power in the region and Czechoslovakia at its mercy.57
With the blessing -- and slight prompting – of the British, Sikorski tried to
establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.58 The London Poles were stoic in
doing so, as the Soviet Union had committed numerous crimes against Polish people in
eastern Poland during its occupation of the territory from 1939 to 1941. Soviet
authorities deported between 1.25 and 1.6 million Poles to Siberia and Central Asia in
less than two years.59 In addition to the deportations, the Soviets executed thousands of
52
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Polish prisoners.60 The London Poles were willing to work with the Soviets despite their
crimes. British support was instrumental in getting the two enemies to reconcile.61
Initially, Sikorski’s willingness to work with the Soviets paid off. On 30 July 1941, shortly
after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the two governments signed the SikorskiMaisky Agreement. Because of this agreement, tens of thousands of Poles deported to
the Soviet Union escaped to the Middle East.62 Stalin and Sikorski differed on the
Polish-Soviet border and Stalin obstinately refused to let all of the Poles in the Soviet
Union leave, however.63 Sikorski was hopeful, despite these issues, that the two
governments could maintain a working relationship with the help of Western arbitration.
The goodwill of the Polish Government-in-Exile in establishing friendly relations
with the Soviet Union was for naught. The Soviets broke relations with the London
Poles over the discovery of the Katyn Forest Massacre by the Nazis in April 1943.64 The
N.K.V.D. killed approximately 14,500 Polish army officers, policemen, and intelligentsia
in the Katyn forest near Smolensk in April and May of 1940.65 During and after World
War II, Soviet policy concerning the Katyn Massacre was to deny responsibility for it and
place blame on the Nazis. When the London Poles got wind of the massacre, they
asked for an investigation by the International Red Cross.66 The Soviets knew that an
impartial investigation of the massacre would expose their guilt. Therefore, the Soviets
broke relations with the London Poles in order to stymie the investigation. This break in
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relations delegitimized the Polish Government-in-Exile in the eyes of the West. The
position of Poland vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the Allied camp had reached a nadir. By
the spring of 1943, the Soviet Union had been part of the Big Three Powers facing Nazi
Germany for a year and a half. This was because the Western Allies needed to
cooperate with the Soviets, who were doing the bulk of the fighting against Nazi
Germany, in order to achieve victory in the European Theater.67 The Soviets were
considered by Britain and the United States to be higher in precedence than any other
member of the Allies. If the Soviet Union turned its back on a government, then that
government lost credibility among all of the Allies. The Soviets successfully managed to
block Polish requests to investigate the massacre. The failure of Polish calls for an
impartial investigation further delegitimized the Polish Government-in-Exile. After the
Polish-Soviet break in relations, the British Government began to draw down its military
support to the Polish resistance.68 Popular support for the Polish cause began to
dwindle and British fears of damaging the British-Soviet alliance became paramount.69
The Soviets forced the Western Allies to choose between supporting them or the
London Poles.
The West ignored the Katyn Massacre as the obvious warning sign of Soviet
oppression that it was.70 For the Poles, Western reaction to Katyn was the clearest
betrayal of the war. In the words of Jan Nowak, who was in London as an agent of the
Polish resistance, “British reaction to these events was the greatest blow since the
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beginning of the war.”71 The British government knew that the Soviets were possibly
guilty, but did not investigate or blame them during the war in order to maintain the
alliance. The United States followed Britain’s lead in ignoring questions concerning the
official Soviet version of the massacre.
Before the entry of the Soviet Union into the Allied camp in 1941, the British
showed nothing but support for the London Poles. By 1943, they were supporting Soviet
claims of Nazi responsibility for the Katyn Massacre without serious question. Polish
interests and Western interests showed themselves to be different. The Western Allies
wanted to maintain their alliance with the Soviet Union more than they were willing to
honor previous support for the Polish Government-in-Exile.
As the war wound down, territorial changes became a pressing issue. In late
1941, the United States and the United Kingdom signed the Atlantic Charter, which
stated that they supported no territorial changes to any nation after the war. The Poles,
pressed by Stalin since the signing of the Sikorski-Maisky Agreement to give up territory
in the east, felt buttressed by the charter.72 Churchill went back on the charter at the
Tehran Conference in 1943 when he described to Stalin how he supported moving
Poland further west at the expense of Germany and to the benefit of the Soviet Union.73
Roosevelt supported territorial changes to Poland at the Tehran Conference as well.
According to Arthur Bliss Lane, American ambassador to Poland from 1945 to 1947,
Roosevelt owns a lion’s share of the blame for Poland’s fate. On Roosevelt at Tehran,
Lane wrote, “When he [Roosevelt] made essential concessions at Tehran, the die was
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cast.”74 The London Poles did not learn of Western support for territorial changes to
Poland at the end of the war until after the Tehran Conference concluded. When
Churchill revealed to the public his support for Soviet territorial claims in eastern Poland,
Poles reacted with dismay. Jan Nowak wrote of his reaction, “When I listened to these
arguments I was filled with a rage I could hardly contain.” In the eyes of Poles, “Stalin
had been given the green light; the way to Poland was open.”75
The Western Allies gave in to Soviet pressure concerning the Katyn Massacre
and postwar territorial changes because of how they viewed their Soviet ally. They
created a propaganda driven view of Stalin as benevolent “Uncle Joe” in order to sell
the alliance with the Soviet Union to their people. In the United States, Stalin was Time
magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1942. Time described the K.G.B., in a 1943 article, as
an analog to the F.B.I. It did not report on the Gulag system or the institutionalized
Soviet culture of repression. As historian Halik Kochanski puts it, “The pro-Soviet
publicity machine was active in the United States and the Office of War Information
(OWI) ensured that newspapers followed that line.”76 In Britain, the government
information policy was pro-Soviet as well. For example, in May 1944, Churchill reported
to the House of Commons that, “The discipline and military etiquette of the Russian
Armies are unsurpassed.”77 Anyone who has studied the march of the Red Army to
Berlin knows that what Churchill said is outrageously false. In order to justify the initial
creation of the Western-Soviet alliance, the West ignored Soviet invasions of six
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sovereign nations before 1941.78 The West wrote off Soviet annexations as something
that could be negotiated later. The West condemned Nazi invasions of sovereign
nations, yet allied with a country just as guilty. In hindsight, the views of the West about
Stalin during World War II appear woefully misguided. The West thought that Stalin,
Churchill’s “friend and ally,” was a reasonable partner whom they could work with after
the war’s conclusion.79 In order to sell themselves as being in a just alliance to rid the
world of evil, they selectively ignored the evil they allied with.
Some in Britain did realize the predicament that Poland was facing towards the
end of the war, but were not sympathetic. Popular British opinion held the Poles
obstinate and, as A.P. Herbert, a humorist and Member of Parliament, titled his poem
on the Poles, “Unreasonable.” He wrote in December 1944, “‘Unreasonable’ Poles, why
do you falter? / Be sensible – be realistic, pray. / Yours are the only frontiers that must
alter: / You are the one crusader in the way. / Unreasonable Poles, preserve tradition /
In just two centuries, you must allow, / You’ve thrice enjoyed benevolent partition. / For
Heaven’s sake, why start to argue now?”80 Rather than take some responsibility for
Poland’s situation, the British found it easier to blame the Poles themselves. According
to Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile from
1943 to 1944, Churchill accused the London Poles of causing Stalin to found the Lublin
Committee.81 Like Churchill’s claim that the Red Army had supreme discipline, this
accusation is false. The London Poles did not force Stalin to support the Lublin
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Committee. Blaming Stalin’s actions on the Polish Government-in-Exile was an out for
Churchill to ignore his own failures concerning Poland.
It is possible that the West understood that it was signing away Eastern Europe
to the Soviets when it made the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements in 1944 and 1945,
respectively. Roosevelt and Churchill expected Stalin to maintain a sphere of influence
in Eastern Europe after the war’s conclusion. The Percentages Agreement, signed by
Churchill and Stalin in October 1944, evidences this.82 The agreement gave Britain and
the Soviet Union license to have a percentage of influence in the nations of southeast
Europe after the war. The caveat to the West’s acceptance of Soviet control of Eastern
Europe was Soviet assent to democratic elections in their sphere. The Big Three
powers agreed on the importance of democracy in Europe after the war at the Yalta and
Potsdam Conferences. Arthur Bliss Lane, who witnessed Soviet controlled elections
after the war in Poland, wrote, “The hypocrisy of the phrase ‘free and unfettered
elections’ was tragically obvious.”83 Indeed, the Soviet Union had decades of
experience in producing fraudulent elections. The West essentially accepted
substituting one undemocratic, repressive power for another. Regardless of whether or
not the West thought that Stalin would allow Eastern Europe to be truly democratic, the
West understood that Stalin would control the region. The West accepted Poland’s
domination by the Soviet Union at the end of the war.
Poles saw their allies abandon support for an independent Poland; they saw their
allies renege on official positons; they saw their allies buy into a false characterization of
Stalin and the Soviet Union. The crowning symbolic event in Poland’s failed relationship
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with the West was the London Victory Celebrations of 1946. Poland, along with only
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, did not march in the London victory parade.
Diplomatic disorder resulting from British derecognition of the Polish Government-inExile prevented a Polish cohort from attending. That Poles did not march along with
their Western allies was symbolic of how Poles felt that the West treated their country.
In the minds of Poles, they gave equal service to the Allied cause, but reaped little
reward. According to Jan Ciechanowski, the Polish Government-in-Exile’s ambassador
to the United States from 1940 to 1945, what really happened to Poland:
…was not merely a change of government. By arbitrarily determining Poland’s
territorial and political status, in violation of her constitutional and sovereign rights, the
Big Three Powers had actually interrupted the continuity of the Polish State. They had
entirely disregarded the will of the Polish people. They had carried out the fifth partition
of Poland.84
Poland was not a part of the winners circle. Though liberated from the Nazis, Poland
lost the war. According to Poles, responsibility for Poland’s defeat lay with their allies.
It is understandable why Poles blame the West for the dismal fate of Poland
during and after the war -- it is understandable why they feel betrayed by the West. The
West is, in part, to blame for the failure of the Warsaw Uprising. According to the Polish
narrative of victimhood, the West abandoned Poland to Soviet control because it was in
the best interest of the West to do so. Diplomatically, the West failed to support Polish
interests over Soviet interests consistently. Poles, after the war, viewed themselves as
acting in good faith towards their allies, only to meet betrayal. From the Polish
perspective, the Polish Government-in-Exile and the Underground State worked in the
best interests of Poland and in the interests of democracy and self-determination. The
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Polish narrative of betrayal holds that Poland’s dubious allies hamstrung the efforts of
Poland’s resistance movement. This narrative points to the actions of the West that hurt
Poland’s chances for independence after the war, and weaves them into a historical
identity of victimhood.

Metanarratives
One additional compelling reason why the Poles were apt to think of themselves
as a martyred people after World War II is that there is a dominant narrative in their
history of glorious victimhood. Polish victimhood is not pitiable – it is a victimhood that
provides a sense of place and purpose. Throughout their history, Poles have been the
victims of foreign aggression from both east and west. Poland first experienced national
victimhood during the middle ages. The Mongols nearly destroyed Poland in the 1240s
and the Teutonic Knights did the same in the 14th and 15th centuries. Polish victimhood
reemerged during the Partitions of the 18th century. Over the course of the last 250
years, Poland became thoroughly engrossed in a metanarrative of victimhood and
martyrdom.
Polish history since the First Partition of Poland in 1772 is cyclical. Poland has
gone through two cycles -- one starting in 1772 and one in 1939 – and they consist of
three parts. The first part is betrayal, the second is death, and the third is resurrection.
Poland’s cyclical narrative fundamentally draws parallels to the story of Jesus Christ’s
life. Death in the Polish narrative is the result of collusion and perfidy on the part of
Poland’s neighbors. The first “death” of Poland occurred during the Partitions of the 18th
century; the second resulted from the Soviet and Nazi invasion of 1939. The Betrayal of
Christ is a rough parallel. Poland suffered long periods of national anguish during its
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occupations in both the 19th and 20th centuries. Christ’s crucifixion is the mirror of this
suffering.85 Polish national uprisings (the November Uprising of 1830 and the January
Uprising of 1863-4) in the 19th century were Poland’s first crucifixion. Poland’s second
crucifixion was its experience during World War II.86 Poland adopted an identity of
martyrdom and victimhood from its suffering at the hands of its occupiers.87 Just as
Christ rose from the dead, so has Poland after the fall of communism in 1989. Poland’s
national rebirth concludes the cycle – Poland is redeemed, reborn, and delivered.
The idea of Polish history having religious undertones first took shape in the
Polish romantic movement of the early 19th century. Polish romanticists put forth the
idea that Poland is the Christ of Europe. The Poles have traditionally associated their
Catholic faith with their nationalism.88 Polish intelligentsia saw Poland as a crucified
nation -- a nation that suffered for the sins of Europe.89 Polish romanticists depicted
Poland in messianic terms. Adam Mickiewicz’s poem, Dziady is an example of Poland
portrayed as the Christ of Europe. In his poem, Poland will experience resurrection
through divine salvation one day.90 By describing Poland as the Christ of Europe, Polish
romanticists fostered a sense of national destiny in martyrdom. Christ is the archetypical
martyr – because Poland follows his path, Poland has a role of martyrdom to live up to.
This historical identity helped mold the Polish view of themselves as martyrs following
World War II.
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Poles find catharsis in portraying themselves in a mystical, romantic light rather
than as an unremarkable, unlucky people.91 They find positive associations in
martyrdom whether they believe in Poland as the Christ of Europe or not. When
struggling to figure out how to reconcile themselves with the fate of their nation and
people at the end of World War II, Poles again turned to the idea of Poland as a
martyred nation. Poland was in a familiar position after the war – occupied and
brutalized by foreign powers. It was natural for Poles to take on a martyred identity after
the war. It was natural for them to feel betrayed, insomuch as their betrayal helped to
underscore their impeccable victimhood and martyrdom.

On Interpretations of Betrayal
“Western Betrayal,” as a historical concept, is a subject of contention. There are
many viewpoints. Among those who do and among those who do not support the idea,
there are multiple sub-positions. There is a mainstream view and a conspiratorial view
in support of the idea of Western Betrayal. On the other hand, there are two positons
against the concept of Western Betrayal: one that the West was unhelpful, but not
complicit in Poland’s fate, and the other that the West simply had no control over the
situation.
The overall position of those who support the idea of Western Betrayal is that the
West was complicit towards Soviet designs on Poland. Evidence for this point of view
largely rests on the actions of Churchill and Roosevelt during the Yalta Conference.92
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The given reasons why the Western leaders were partial to Soviet demands at the
conference are both practical and, in the case of Roosevelt, ideological.
The mainstream view has its crux in the argument that the West wanted to
appease Stalin. Both Churchill and Roosevelt needed Stalin to maintain pressure on
Nazi Germany; otherwise, their countries would face a significantly harder military
challenge in the European Theater.93 The Eastern Front of World War II produced
perhaps eight times more Nazi casualties than did the Western Front, and ensnared the
bulk of Nazi forces.94 As the Soviets did the majority of the fighting against the Nazis,
the Western Allies thought it key to maintain cordial relations. Soviet help against Japan
was also a concern. Soviet military might affected Western options even after the war’s
conclusion, as the Red Army significantly outnumbered Western forces in Europe.
Although tensions began to run high between former allies at the war’s conclusion, the
West was not in a position to try to liberate Poland through military means.95
For Roosevelt in particular, the establishment of the United Nations was a vital
political goal. Stalin’s support of the United Nations was crucial for its success.96 By
allowing Stalin to have a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Roosevelt believed that
he would create goodwill between Stalin and the Western powers. According to those
who believe that the West betrayed Poland, a drive to foster goodwill with the Soviets
caused Roosevelt to doom the Warsaw Uprising and Poland at large.97 Roosevelt
followed Stalin’s direction concerning Eastern Europe and this left Churchill with no
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room to act against Sovietization, as he would be doing so without the help of Britain’s
most powerful ally.98
The conspiratorial viewpoint is fundamentally similar to the mainstream view,
save it is more extreme. The conspiratorial view holds that Roosevelt conspired to
Sovietize Poland after the war. This position points to the unpublished memoirs of
Francis Spellman for evidence. Spellman, a cardinal from New York City, was a
confidant of Roosevelt during his presidency. Spellman was privy, therefore, to some of
Roosevelt’s private thoughts. Spellman’s memoirs, proponents claim, reveal
Roosevelt’s bias toward the Soviets. According to academic Witold Kiezun, “Under a
25-years confidentiality clause, Roosevelt revealed to Spellman his concept to eradicate
global colonialism in joint effort with the USSR after the war.”99 For supporters of the
conspiratorial viewpoint, Roosevelt pushed a pro-Soviet, leftist global agenda and
Poland was one of its major casualties. However, there is no further corroborating
evidence to back Spellman’s claims. The lack of other evidence presents a major
problem for the conspiratorial position.
In addition to Roosevelt’s alleged motivations, conspiracy supporters hold that
Soviet agents swayed the U.S. through manipulation of public opinion and
governmental infiltration to support Soviet claims on postwar Poland. Proponents of the
conspiratorial view point to Oskar Lange as an example of conspiracy in the West in
favor of Soviet control of Poland. Lange, a Polish economist based at the University of
Chicago, was a public intellectual held in high regard by the White House and the
Polish-American community. After visiting the Soviet Union at the behest of Stalin in
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1943, the Soviets recruited Lange for use both as a covert agent and as a leader of
post-war Poland. Lange publically backed the Lublin Committee over the Polish
Government-in-Exile.100 When looking for someone to act as an intermediary between
themselves and the Soviets on Polish questions in 1944, the United States Government
chose Lange. He was one of the worst choices to represent the interests of the United
States.101 Not only was he a double agent for the Soviets, but also, he was an able
propagandist for the cause of a communist Poland. Lange helped soften the image of
the Lublin Committee in the eyes of the American Government and worked to make it
appear more acceptable to Polish-Americans. Lange presents the perfect example for
those in the conspiratorial camp who believe that the Soviet Union, through its agents in
the West, was able to both manipulate public opinion and governmental action.
The counterpoint to the betrayal argument is the view that the subjugation of
Poland was inevitable. According to this position, Poland was fated for domination by
whichever side won the Eastern Front. It was too weak and small to be able to
determine its own destiny. There was no way that the limited and, after the Warsaw
Uprising, directionless Polish resistance could have prevented the Red Army from
imposing its will.102
There are two viewpoints to the position that the West did not betray Poland:
those who believe that the Western Allies did not deliberately choose to betray their
promises to the Polish people, but were preoccupied by the course of the war and those
who view Poland’s fate as a fait accompli. Those who believe that Western neglect,
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rather than perfidy, led to Poland’s demise hold that, while the West had no malice
towards the noncommunist Polish resistance, it was not in any sort of realistic position
to make a difference in Poland’s fate.103 The West could not stop the Red Army from
descending on Poland without having to start a war with the Soviets. Western leaders
tried to work out an understanding with the Soviets at the Yalta and Potsdam
conferences that would allow for democracy in Eastern Europe, but the Soviets used
their own meanings of the terms “democracy” and “freedom.”104 From this viewpoint,
Soviet manipulations of Western goodwill are not the fault of the West. According to this
reasoning, one cannot label the West as being malicious in its treatment of Poland.
The fait accompli positon is, essentially, an extreme version of the view that the
West neglected Poland. While Western promises of support to the Polish Governmentin-Exile may have been ill advised, there was nothing that the West could have done. In
this fatalistic view, the Polish Government-in-Exile had impossible goals.105 The London
Poles imagined themselves in possession of far more support than the West could
reasonably give.106 Delusions of support by the West allowed Poles to think of
themselves as a betrayed people. In reality, according to this view, the Polish resistance
asked for far more than it could have received and did not think to alter its demands to
fit the situation.
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Conclusions
At the end of the war, many Poles felt that they, in the words of Radio Lightning’s
last transmission, “had been treated worse than Hitler’s satellites.” Poland was,
ostensibly, one of the winners of the war. It had faithfully served the Allied coalition, in
spite of its strained relationship with the Soviets. The Nazi threat to Polish existence had
passed. However, the Poles felt betrayed and victimized. The largest act of Polish
resistance during the war, the Warsaw Uprising, was largely unsupported by Poland’s
allies. Poles see betrayal in this inaction by their allies in the face of Nazi brutality. The
suffering and destruction of Warsaw is a poignant example of Poland’s perceived
martyrdom. Politically, Polish attempts to act as an equal member of the Allies failed.
Poland’s allies acted in what they perceived to be their own best interests, not in the
best interests of Poland. The West, ultimately, chose its alliance with the Soviets over
support to Poland’s resistance movement. The actions of the West concerning its
alliance with Poland may appear to an outside observer perfectly in-line with the political
realities of the day; however, this is not the view of the Poles. Poles see perfidy where
others see inevitability. Further helping Poles adopt a view of victimhood is Poland’s
historical narrative. Because Poland found itself betrayed by its neighbors before, Poles
found it easy to fit what happened to Poland during and after World War II in a
metanarrative of betrayal and victimhood. Because Poles view their country as martyred
by foreign occupation in the 19th century, it was easy for them to view their country as
martyred by foreign occupation in the 20th century.
Why Poles put their history through the lenses of betrayal and victimhood is
clear: Poles have a national narrative of martyrdom and the events of World War II fall
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in line with this narrative. Poles see the actions of their allies within the context of the
historical themes of victimhood and betrayal; therefore, the Poles do not look to the
geopolitical realities of their situation, but to the self-interested acts of the West as
evidence for the fulfillment of Poland’s destiny as a martyred nation. Poles choose not
to see themselves as failures, but rather as glorious victims; they choose not to see
themselves as unlucky, but as martyred.
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